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The Tallinn  Manuals  (the Manuals)  attempted  to clarify  how  to apply  existing
international  law  to cyber  operations.  Though  the Manuals  are  non-binding
instruments, the Group of International Experts claimed that they reflected the lex
lata  applicable  to cyber  operations.  However,  this  claim  is  questionable  due
to the dominating role of a few Western states in the drafting process and the linked
neglect of the practice of “affected states” in cyber operations. This article examines
the quality of the Manuals’ drafting process and the composition and impartiality
of the experts involved. It focuses on the issue of the prohibition of the use of force.
The aim  of this  examination  is  not  to discuss  whether  the Manuals  provided
the right  answer  to the question  of how  international  law  applies  to cyber
operations. Rather, they function as a case study of how legal scholarship may affect
the making  of international  law.  The article  concludes  that  certain  rules
in the Manuals are marked by NATO influence and overlook the practice of other
states engaged in cyber operations. Therefore, the Manuals disregard the generality
of state practice, which should be the decisive factor in the formation of customary
international law. As far as “political activism” may be involved, the article argues
that  the role  of legal  scholars  as assistants  to the cognition  of international  law
could be compromised.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“In the 21st  Century, bits  and bytes  can be  as threatening as bullets  and
bombs.”1
The statement  made  by a former  US  Deputy  Secretary  of Defense  holds
true,  since  the Internet  has  extended  its  role  from  a means
of communication to an enabling technology facilitating almost every aspect
of human activities. Not only actors in the private sector rely on information
technology,  but  also  government  agencies  and entities  managing  critical
infrastructures  utilize  cyber  technology  to discharge  their  functions.
The fact  that  states  increasingly  attach  their  core  functions
to the interconnectivity  of cyberspace  exposes  them to this  new paradigm
of threats.  For  instance,  the DDoS  attack  on Estonia  in 2007  disabled
the websites of all ministries, two major banks, several political parties and
the parliamentary  email  server,  the credit  cards  and  automatic  teller
machines (ATMs) leading to the whole nation being halted.2
The international  community  is  aware  of the rise  of cyber  threats  and
attempts  to extend  the existing  international  law  to regulate  cyber
operations.  The United  Nations  Group  of Governmental  Experts
on Developments  in  the  Field  of  Information  and  Telecommunication
in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) concluded in its 3rd report
in 2013  that  international  law,  in particular  the Charter  of the United
Nations  (UN  Charter),  applies  to cyberspace.3 However,  there  is  no
consensus  neither  from  the UN  GGE  nor  the whole  international
community clarifying how exactly international law is applicable to cyber
operations. Against this backdrop, the “Tallinn Manual on the International
Law  Applicable  to Cyber  Warfare”  and  the “Tallinn  Manual  2.0
on the International  Law  Applicable  to Cyber  Operations”  (“Tallinn
1 Lynn, W. J. (2011) Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy as Delivered by Deputy
Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn. [speech] 14 July. Available from: http://www.defense.gov/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593 [Accessed 12 July 2018].
2 Tikk,  E.  Kaska,  K.  and Vihul,  L.  (2010)  International  Cyber  Incidents:  Legal  Considerations.
Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, pp. 18–24.
3 (2013) UN Doc A/68/98. pp. 6, 8. 
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Manuals”)  emerged  by the articulation  of a group  of legal  scholars  and
international  lawyers.  The Tallinn  Manuals  are  the products
of the deliberation  of the International  Group  of Experts  invited
by the NATO  Cooperative  Cyber  Defence  Center  of Excellence  (CCDCOE)
on how  international  law  applies  to cyber  operations,  but  they  are  non-
-binding  instruments.  The Tallinn  Manuals  cover  both  cyber  operations
in armed conflict  and peacetime,  while  at the same time  address  the law
of state  responsibility,  sovereignty,  human  rights,  air  and  aviation  law,
space  law and the law of the sea.  The publication  of the Manuals  has  not
only  attracted  the states’  attention  but  has  also  lead  to an academic
discussion on cyber operations because of the group’s rather bold statement
that  the rules  in the Manuals,  made  through  the consensus
of the International Group of Experts, reflects the lex lata applicable to cyber
operations  and  avoids  articulating  lex  ferenda.4 If  this  claim  were  true,
the Manuals  would  articulate  the international  law  applicable  to cyber
operations  with  unprecedented  clarity.  Accordingly,  this  article  aims
to scrutinize  the legitimacy  of the Tallinn  Manuals  as products  of legal
scholarship  contributing  to the international  law-making  on cyber
operations. In doing so, this article consists of two parts. Firstly, attention is
paid to the role of legal scholarship in law-making. Secondly, the legitimacy
of experts involved in the drafting of the Tallinn Manuals will be examined.
Furthermore,  the article  assesses  the quality  of the Manuals’  drafting
process  with  regard  to the prohibition  of the use  of force,  one
of the fundamental  principles  of the UN Charter  since  it  was  the starting
point  of the debate  on the suitability  of international  law  as a normative
framework for the regulation of cyber operations. The ultimate goal is not
to assess the quality of the Tallinn Manuals,  but to demonstrate how legal
scholarship can affect the making of international law.
2. ROLE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN LAW-MAKING
The orthodox doctrine views international law-making in terms of sources.5
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the main
reference to both the sources of international law and its making. However,
4 The Tallinn  Manual  on the International  Law  Applicable  to Cyber  Warfare, p. 19;  see  also
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, p. 3.
5 Skouteris,  T.  (2001)  The Force  of a Doctrine:  Art.  38  of the PCIJ  Statute  and  the Sources
of International Law. In: Fleur Johns et al. (eds.). Events: The Force of International Law. New
York: Routledge, pp. 69–80.
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due to the plethora of actors using and speaking of international law, it is
undeniable  that  communicative  practices  assimilate  themselves
to the process of international law-making.6 In particular, legal scholars and
international  lawyers  play  a significant  role  by interpreting  the existing
international law to solve the novel global challenges. The main question is
to what extent legal scholarship contributes to international law-making. 
In order  to give  a precise  response,  it  is  imperative  to discuss
the relationship  between  the sources  doctrine  and  Article  38  (1)  (d)
of the ICJ  Statute  before  addressing  the variety  of contemporary
international-law making theories recognizing communicative practices.
2.1 LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND ARTICLE 38 (1) (D)
Article  38  (1)  (d)  of the ICJ  Statute  stipulates  that  judicial  decisions  and
the teachings  of the most  highly  qualified  publicists  are  the subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law. This could be read that legal
scholarship is the
“subsidiary  means  for the determination  of law,  not  a subsidiary  source
of law”.7
Legal scholarship may thus present evidence of international law through
its analysis  of collected state practice  reflecting certain international  legal
norms.  However,  19th  century  legal  scholars  have  often  referred  also
to the works of famous men such as Grotius,  Pufendorf,  Westlake and  Vattel
to validate  their  arguments.8 It  remains  doubtful  to what  extent  legal
scholarship  can objectively substantiate  international  practice  as evidence
of international  law.  In the joint  separate  opinion  of Judges  Higgins,
Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Congo v. Belgium case, the Judges discussed
the question whether a state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over persons
having no connection with the forum state when the accused is not present
in that state.  Despite the contribution of legal  scholarship on the question,
the Joint  Separate  Opinion  rejected  scholarly  writings  asserting  that
6 Venzke,  I.  (2013)  Contemporary  Theories  and  International  Law-making.  In:  Brölmann
Catherine  and  Radi  Yannick  (eds.).  Research  Handbook  on the Theory  and  Practice
of International Lawmaking. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 66–73.
7 Kammerhofer, J. (2013) Lawmaking by Scholars. In: Brölmann Catherine and Radi Yannick
(eds.).  Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Lawmaking. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, p. 306.
8 Parry,  C.  (1965)  The Sources  and  Evidence  of International  Law. Manchester:  Manchester
University Press, p. 103.
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the treaties on crimes and offences are evidence of universality as a ground
for the exercise of jurisdiction recognized in international law.9 The Opinion
noted that
“[t]he assertion [from the writings of eminent jurists] that certain treaties
and court decisions rely on universal jurisdiction, which in fact they do not,
does  not  evidence  an international  practice  recognised  as custom.  And
the policy arguments advanced in some of the writings can certainly suggest
why a practice or a court decision should be regarded as desirable, or indeed
lawful; but contrary arguments are advanced too,  and in any event, these
also cannot serve to substantiate an international practice where virtually
none exists.”10
Although  certain  scholar  writings  have  been  rejected  by the ICJ,  this
does not mean that  the role of legal scholars as assistants to the cognition
of international  is  ignored.  In the Advisory  opinion  on the Construction
of a Wall, the ICJ made reference to and agreed with the views of the editor
of Oppenheim’s international law.11
Accordingly, the ICJ holds full discretion to grasp the legal scholarship
which  it  holds  to reflect  the applicable  international  law.  Moreover,
Article 38 (2)  of the Statute of the ICJ allows the ICJ  to decide the dispute,
if the parties  agree,  on the ground  of any  norms  not  contained
in Article 38 (1). It appears therefore that the ICJ is endowed with the power
to appreciate  any  evidence  that  manifests  rules  of international  law,  not
limited  to legal  scholarship  or judicial  decisions.  Against  this  backdrop,
legal scholarship does not have any particular intrinsic epistemic power and
could, at best, be deemed as “evidence of the law”.12
2.2 COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICE
While the normative-positivist considers legal scholarship as mere evidence
of the law, many contemporary theories on international  law-making take
9 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium).
The Joint  Separate  Opinion  of Judge  Higgins,  Kooijmans  and  Buergenthal,  Judgement
of 14 February 2002. ICJ Reports 2002. para. 26. 
10 Op. cit., para. 44.
11 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory
Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 57.
12 Kammerhofer, J.  (2013) op. cit., p. 308;  see also Triggs,  G. (2005) The Public International
Lawyer and the Practice of International Law.  Australian Yearbook of International  Law,  24,
pp. 202–205.
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into  account  the potential  of the use  of international  law  language
contributing to its  making.13 This can be seen, for example, in the debates
over  the meaning  of “force” pursuant  to,  but  undefined  by,  Article  2  (4)
of the UN  Charter.  Also,  the authoritative  meanings  of “combatant”  and
“civilian”  are  derived  from  the practice  of interpreting  these  terms.
International  law, in the eyes of contemporary theories,  is  not  only made
through  the conclusion  of treaties  but  also  by way  of a communicative
process  of speaking  and  using  international  law  by the various  actors,
which  are  not  only  states.  Therefore,  contemporary  theories  take  into
account the multiplicity of actors contributing to international law-making
by participating in the interpretative process.
First,  the New  Haven  School,  including  Michael  Reisman,  argues  that
international  law  emerges  from  a communicative  process  among
a multiplicity  of actors.14 In particular,  aspects  of humanitarian  concern
have been discussed by a wide range of actors in the international political
discourse. Even though humanitarianism is construed as social fact, it can
be  weighed  as a point  of reference  for  legal  arguments  or normative
judgments.
The System Theory supports the communicative process as law-making
but  distinguishes  itself  from  the New  Haven  School in that  it  holds  that
interpretation  in international  law  cannot  be  diminished  to the pursuit
of values.  Niklas  Luhmann elaborates  Gunther  Teubner’s  proposition
of “Autopoiesis”  to describe  the self-reproduction  of international  law
whose communication is  presented as referring to its  own same system.15
The validation  of the legal  claims  relies  upon legal  claims.16 Against  this
background, Teubner argues that
“global  law  will  grow  mainly  from  the social  peripheries,  not  from
the political centres of nation-states and international institutions”
and the non-state actors are increasingly important in societal law-making.17
13 Venzke, I. (2013), op. cit., p. 66.
14 Reisman,  M.  (1981)  International  Lawmaking:  A Process  of Communication.  American
Society of International Law Proceedings, 75, pp. 101–120.
15 Luhmann, N. (1993) Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 98.
16 Ibid.
17 Teubner, G. (1997) Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society. In:  Global Law
Without a State. Hants: Dartmount, pp. 3–28.
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The Governance Theory also acknowledges the rise of non-state actors
in law-making.18 However, according to Slaughter, the engagements among
domestic regulators, the private sector, technicians and academia resulting
in the informal  international  law-making  raises  the question
of accountability. Since
“the essence  of a network  is  a process  rather  than  an entity,  it  cannot  be
captured or controlled in the ways that typically structure formal legitimacy
in a democratic polity.”19
The Global  Administrative  Law (GAL) theory criticizes  that,  although
the sources doctrine ties international law to the consent of states claiming
the legitimate  order,  it  does  not  capture  “everything  that  matters”.20
The GAL  theory  has  been  established  to respond  to the accountability
deficiency in the international  law-making process  by introducing general
principles  of administrative  law  such  as transparency,  procedural
participation and review. Under the view of GAL, making international law
through  interpretation  is  deemed  as an exercise  of public  authority,
provided that the interpreters
“have  the capacity  to establish  their  own  statements  about  the law
as reference points for legal discourse”
that others could only escape at a cost.21
All in all, contemporary theories consider communicative practices, such
as interpretation,  as part  of international  law-making.  However,  legal
arguments  claiming  to establish  legal  rules  may  disguise  underlying
political agendas. This subjectivity could indeed undermine the legitimacy
of the communicative law-making process. 
18 Pauwelyn, J. (2012) Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research
Questions. In: Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds.). Informal International
Lawmaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15–20. 
19 Slaughter,  A.-M.  (2000)  Agencies  on the Loose?  Holding  Government  Networks
Accountable.  In:  George  Bermann  and  Peter  Lindseth  (eds.).  Transatlantic  Regulatory
Cooperation, Legal Problems and Political Prospects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 531.
20 Kingsbury, B. Krisch, N. and Stewart, R. (2005) The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 68, p. 17.
21 Venzke, I. (2013), op. cit., p. 85.
74 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 13:1
3. THE TALLINN MANUALS AND THE COGNITION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CYBER OPERATIONS
In principle,  the Tallinn  Manuals  written  under  the International  Group
of Experts’  mandate  amount  to mere  legal  scholarship  serving
as a subsidiary  means  for  identifying  the sources  of international  law
on cyber  operations.  The role  of these  experts  can  be  approximated
to the role  of the International  Law  Commission  (ILC)  and  other
independent entities where legal experts are assigned to study and clarify
international law. 
Michael Schmitt, the Director of the International Group of Experts, states
in the introduction of the Manuals that
“This  Manual  is  meant  to be  a reflection  of law as it  existed  at the point
of the Manual’s  adoption  by the two  International  Groups  of Experts
in June  2016.  It  is  not  a “best  practice”  guide,  does  not  represent
“progressive  development  of the law”,  and  is  policy  and  politics-neutral.
In other words, Tallinn Manual 2.0 is intended as an objective restatement
of the lex lata. Therefore, the Experts involved in both projects assiduously
avoided including statement reflecting lex ferenda.”22
This  statement  confirms  the self-perception  of the International  Group
of Experts that its task was to not to make law but to articulate the law as it
exists.  The position  of the Group  is  approximate  to the sources  doctrine
by denying its capacity to make law but accentuating its role as an assistant
to the cognition  of law.  To test  the validity  of this  statement,  both
the legitimacy  of the Group  and  the use  of force  rule  under  the Tallinn
Manuals will be discussed.
3.1 LEGITIMACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS
The Group’s  legitimacy  can  be  discussed  from  the perspectives
of the sources  doctrine  as well  as contemporary  theories  with  a view
to the predictability  and  consistency  of international  legal  rules.
The question of objectivity of legal scholars’  discourse is  intertwined with
the legitimacy  of the legal  scholars  themselves.23 Therefore,  both
22 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, pp. 2–3. 
23 Schachter, O. (1977) The Invisible College of International Lawyers. Northwestern University
Law Review, 72, pp. 219–221.
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the composition and the authority of the International Group of Experts will
be examined.
The International  Group  of Experts  drafting  the first  version
of the Tallinn  Manual  was  composed  of 19  experts  ranging  from
international  law  academics,  practitioners,  serving  or former  military
officials  and  technical  experts,  as well  as four  observers  from
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NATO and the US Cyber
Command who also actively participated in the deliberation.24 Experts and
observers of the Tallinn Manual project came from a few Western countries.
Seven experts  (including  the Director)  came from the US.  There were no
participants  from Russia,  China,  Iran and Israel,  all  countries  which  are
reportedly  involved  in cyber  operations.25 The disparity  in the experts’
countries of origin was criticized for its geographical bias.26
When deliberating  the Tallinn  Manual  2.0,  the Group  of Experts  tried
to overturn  this  critique  by emphasizing  the appearance  of experts  from
China,  Japan,  Israel  and  Thailand.27 Though  the majority  of experts  still
came  from  Western  countries,  all  experts  claimed  to participate  in their
personal capacity,28 and that their participation in the drafting process did
not  reflect  their  affiliation.  It  has  therefore  been  argued  that  the lack
of experts  or participants  from  certain  countries  reportedly  engaging
in cyber  operations  may  not  necessarily  undermine  the authority
of the Manuals.29
As regards the legitimacy of the individual  experts,  their  selection was
based on two factors:
(1) an impersonal validity claim; and
(2) the experience and position of the expert.30
24 The International  Group  of Experts  is  divided  into  many  functional  groups,  namely,
Editorial Committee, Legal Group Facilitators, Legal Experts, Technical Experts.
25 See  the list  of International  Group  of Experts appeared  in the Tallinn  Manual
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, pp. 6–9. 
26 Fleck, D. (2013) Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare – A Critical
First Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 18, p. 331.
27 There are Professor  Zhixiong Huang from Wuhan University, Professor  Kazuhiro Nakatani
from University of Tokyo,  Deborah Housen-Couriel from University of Haifa, and Kriangsak
Kittichaisaree, a Member of the ILC from Thailand.
28 The Tallinn  Manual  on the International  Law  Applicable  to Cyber  Warfare, p. 23;  see also
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, p. 2.
29 Roscini, M. (2014)  Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 32.
30 Kessler, O. and Werner, W. (2013) Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law: A Study
of the Tallinn Manual on Cyberwarfare. Leiden Journal of International Law, 26, p. 802.
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Firstly, each expert needed to present himself/herself as independent from
his/her personal preference and convince the audience that the knowledge
he/she  produces  is  validly  objective.31 Secondly,  only  persons  who  hold
specific  skills,  knowledge  and  experience  were  supposed  to be  able
to satisfy the public trust in producing knowledge.
These  two  factors  seem  ambiguous  in the International  Group
of Experts.  Regarding  the first  factor,  despite  its  strong  claim
to impersonality, the experts cannot escape the criticism as to the dominant
position  of Western  countries.  Commentators  have  therefore  not  only
pointed to the disparity of countries where the experts came from, but also
highlighted  the sources  of evidence  used  by the experts  to justify
the existence of lex lata.32 It  has been reported that the rules in the Tallinn
Manuals  are  heavily  drawn  from  the military  manuals  of four  countries
(Canada,  Germany,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States)  with
the underlying claim that
“the international community generally considers these four manuals to be
especially useful during legal research and analysis with respect to conflict
issues”.33
The word  “useful”  may  have  been  used  to avoid  the impression  that
the military  manuals  of four  NATO  states  might  have  served  as direct
sources  of authority.  Against  this  background,  it  is  problematic  that
the International  Group  of Experts  audaciously  asserted  that  the Tallinn
Manuals,  which  in effect  stand  for  the opinions  of a few  Western  states,
represent the international community as a whole.34
As Mégret  has  asserted,  international  humanitarian  law  today  is  still
attached  to the Western  image  of statehood  and  the corresponding
understanding  of international  law’s  nature  and  function.35 While  most
international  lawyers  support  the function  of humanitarian  law
as regulating  warfare,  the realist  or the anti-colonialist  might  perceive
31 Ibid.
32 Fleck, D. (2013), op. cit., pp. 331–351;  see also Kessler,  O. and Werner, W. (2013), op. cit.,
pp. 793–810. 
33 Fleck, D. (2013), op. cit., p. 335.
34 Kessler, O. and Werner, W. (2013), op. cit., p. 803.
35 Mégret,  F.  (2005)  From  ‘Savage’  to ‘Unlawful  Combatant’:  A Postcolonial  Look
at International Humanitarian Law’s Other. In: Anne Ordord (ed.). International Law and Its
Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available also from: https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=918541 
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the role of the law of armed conflict as a tool to reinforce the “unshakeable
grip”  of dominant  states.36 However,  it  would  also  be  unfair  to label
the Tallinn Manuals as products of neo-colonialism.37 Nonetheless, the flaws
in the drafting  process  have  an inherent  potential  to undermine  their
authoritative degree.
The second  factor  in the selection  process  was  the reputation
of the experts. The pertinent element to be examined is the criteria to select
the qualified  experts  to participate  in the Tallinn  Manuals  project.  From
the start,  the Tallinn Manuals were initiated and sponsored by the NATO
CCDCOE which confided the task to select the members of the International
Group of Experts to the Director,  Michael Schmitt, Chair of the international
law department at the US Naval War College and author of widely quoted
articles  related  to cyber  operations.38 Schmitt enjoyed  full  discretion
in composing  the group  of experts.39 Neither  Schmitt nor  the Tallinn
Manuals explain the selection process. The Tallinn Manuals merely describe
the composition  with  reference  to the various  personal  backgrounds:
international  law  academics,  practitioners,  serving  or former  military
officials  and technical  experts.  Though there exists  no determinative rule
under international law how to decide who is a highly qualified publicist
or legal  expert,  the selected  experts  assume  an important  status:  Their
comments were captured in the Tallinn Manuals to which the audience can
make  a reference.  If one  compares  the role  of experts  to judges
at the International  Court  of Justice,  though  they  enjoy  different
competences,  one  can  observe  that  the Court’s  judgments  enjoy  more
credibility and authority as they are made by a representatively composed
body,  rather  than  by a “like-thinking”  group  of experts.40 Therefore,
to firmly  reject  the critique  over  the bias  of experts,  the transparency
of the selection process of experts is  advisable.  Only then can the validity
of the claim that the Tallinn Manuals reflect lex lata be assessed.
36 Ibid.
37 Kessler, O. and Werner, W. (2013), op. cit., p. 803.
38 Michael Schmitt produces many articles related to cyberwarfare, especially during and after
being the Director of the Tallinn Manual and the Tallinn Manual 2.0. But the article before
involving  in the Tallinn  project  that  triggers  the debate  on the legal  aspects  of cyberwar
appears in Schmitt, M. (1998–1999) Computer Network Attacks: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 37, pp. 885–935.
39 The quote is  taken from a presentation  by Michael  Schmitt on the Tallinn  Manual  CyCon
2012 organized  by the NATO  CCDCOE  (see  US Naval  War  College.  (2012)  Cycon  2012
Michael Schmitt: Tallinn Manual Part I. [online video] Available from: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=wY3uEo-Itso (1:40) [Accessed 20 July 2018]. 
40 Schachter, O. (1977), op. cit., p. 222.
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3.2 IMPOSITION OF THE CONVENTIONAL USE OF FORCE 
ON CYBER OPERATIONS
In this  section,  the focus  is  shifted  to the drafting  process  of the Tallinn
Manuals.  To decide  whether  the Tallinn  Manuals  secure  the status
as an instrument  objectively  providing  evidence  of international  law
on cyber operations, one must observe how the rules have been established
in the Manuals.
Due  to the limited  space  and  the large  number  of rules  inscribed
in the Tallinn  Manuals,  it  is  impossible  to analyze  the drafting  process
of each rule. The rules related to the use of force is selected for the analysis
because it represents the cornerstone linking the existing international law
with the novel threat of cyber operations.
The most  vital  aspect  of the application  of the law  on the  use  of force
to cyber operations is:
“under  what  conditions  cyber  operations  can  constitute  the use  of force
prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and customary international
law”.
The International  Group  of Experts  attempts  to extend  the existing
prohibition  of the use  of force  to cover  also  cyber  operations  by referring
to the ICJ’s  statement  in the Nicaragua case  that  distinguished  “the most
grave  forms  of the use  of force  from other  less  grave”.41 The Group concludes
that, despite the lack of a definition of “use of force”, the difference between
use of force and an armed attack relies upon “scale and effect”.42 Rule 11
of the first version of the Tallinn Manuals and Rule 69 of the Tallinn Manual
2.0 stipulate that
“a cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are
comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”
According  to this  assertion,  the consequences  of cyber  operations  are
a vital  factor  to distinguish  “cyber  operations”  that  qualify  as the use
of force  from  those  that  do  not.  The Tallinn  Manuals  also  acknowledge
41 Case  Concerning  Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in and  Against  Nicaragua  (Nicaragua
v. United States of America). Judgement of 27 June 1986. ICJ Report 1986, para. 191.
42 Schmitt,  M. (2015) The Use of Cyber Force and International Law. In: Marc Weller  (ed.).
The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 1111–1114.
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the different  qualitative  level  between  use  of force  and  an armed  attack,
whereas  only cyber operations  reaching  the threshold of an armed attack
trigger the right to self-defense of the victim state.43
However, the adoption of the “scale and effect” threshold leaves much
room  for  interpretation.44 The Group,  therefore,  adopted  an approach
comprising  eight  factors,  to assist  states  in determining  when
the international  community  would  likely  characterize  a cyber  operation
launched against them, or that they conducted, as a use of force.
(1) Severity. A cyber operation causing death or injury of persons is
sufficiently  severe  to qualify  as a use  of force,  while
a psychological  operation  in cyberspace  generating  irritation
or inconvenience would never qualify as such. 
(2) Immediacy. The negative consequences of a cyber operation shall
be immediately visible  to be qualified as a use of force.  Unlike
the less  visible  and delayed consequences,  there  will  be  more
opportunities  to mitigate  those  consequences  or resolve
the situation peacefully. 
(3) Directness. The causation chain of a cyber operation and its effect
shall be examined. The closer the link between a cyber operation
as cause and its effect, the more likely that the cyber operation
will be characterized as a use of force.
(4) Invasiveness.  This  refers  to the conventional  concept  of use
of force  where  there  exists  an intrusion  into  the target  state’s
border.  A cyber  operation  will  be  more invasive  if it  intrudes
into  the secured system of the target  state without  its  consent.
For example,  the attack on domain names belonging to critical
public agencies such as .gov, .mil is more invasive than the attack
directed at non-state specific domain names such as .com.
(5) Measurability  of effects.  Typically,  the effect  of the use  of armed
force is  measurable. However, in cyberspace, the consequences
may be less  apparent.  If the consequences  of a cyber operation
can  be  assessed  in specific  terms  such  as the percentage
of servers disabled and the amount of data corrupted, it is likely
to be considered as a use of force.
43 Rule 69 of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare and Rule 71
of The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations.
44 Schmitt, M. (2015), op. cit., p. 1114.
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(6) Military  character.  A cyber  operation  that  occurs  in a military
context  increases  the likelihood  to be  constituted  as a use
of force.
(7) State  involvement.  If there  is  evidence  that  a state  is  involved
in the cyber  operation,  the chance  that  the cyber  operation
amounts to a use of force will be higher.
(8) Presumptive  legality.  Under  international  law,  it  is  generally
accepted  that  the application  of violence  is  unlawful,  unless
authorized –  such  as in self-defence.  Psychological  operations
and economic coercion are not expressly prohibited. Therefore,
the cyber operation holding a similar characteristic as economic
pressure or psychological operations is less likely to be equated
as a use of force.
Although the “scale and effect” approach embraces the material aspect
of violence  similar  to the implicit  notion  of force  in the conventional  use
of force,  the application  of the eight-factor  rule on cyber operations  is  not
without problems. 
Firstly,  the eight-factor  rule  was  based  in essence  on Michael  Schmitt’s
original  work  written  in 1999  in which  he  gathered  these  factors  based
on his  observation of what  arguments have influenced states  in assessing
whether or not a use of force has taken place.45 However, no hard evidence
of state practice or opinio juris related to the eight-factor rule appears neither
in Schmitt’s original work nor in the Tallinn Manuals. It appears to be based
on the author’s intuition, disguised as an empirical method.
Secondly, certain criteria from the eight-factor rule allow certain kinds
of cyber operations to escape legal regulation as the characteristics of cyber
operations are not fully captured. For instance, the “invasiveness” criterion
is not compatible with DDoS Attacks, where the targeted computer system
or network  is  not  penetrated,  but  thousands  of requests  flood  the target
system  to paralyze  its  function.  The “measurability  of effects”  of cyber
operations is notoriously arduous since the effect-based approach does not
clarify  which  standards  of proof  is  valid.  There  are  various  standards
of proof  to choose  from:  “beyond  any  doubt”46,  “convincing  evidence”47,
“prima  facie  evidence”48,  and  “sufficiently  convincing”49 evidence.
D’Aspremont points  out  that,  due to such  a wide  choice,  the International
45 For further detail of the eight-factor background see Schmitt, M. (1998–1999), op. cit., p. 921.
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Group of Experts may be tempted to maximize the efficacy of evidencing,
for  instance  by lowering  the standard  of proof.50 As to “presumptive
legality”,  the logic  on what  is  not  prohibited  is  permitted  is  obsolete,
as noted by Judge Simma:
“[The fact  that]  the international  legal  order  might  be  consciously  silent
or neutral on a specific fact or act has nothing to do with non liquet, which
concerns a judicial  institution being unable to pronounce itself  on a point
of law  because  it  concludes  that  the law  is  not  clear.  The neutrality
of international law on a certain point simply suggests that there are areas
where international law has not yet come to regulated, or indeed, will never
come to regulate.”51
Accordingly, there is a possibility that certain acts might be tolerated which
does not mean that the act is legal.
It  is  understandable  why  the International  Group  of Experts  asserted
their authority to identify the current  lex lata and to avoid articulating  lex
ferenda.  Had  the experts  decided  to claim  the role  of international  law
legislator,  it  would have contradicted their  own orthodox understanding
of international  law-making,  which  relies  on the consent  of states,  and
would  have  undermined  their  legitimacy.  They,  thus,  chose  a modest
strategy  conceiving  of themselves  as assistants  who  merely  displayed
the current  state  of international  law  by ostensibly  using  the classic  legal
tools. 
46 This  is  the standard  used  by the ICJ  in the Genocide  case  in relation  to demonstrating
the full  knowledge  of the intent  to perpetrate  genocide  by the leaders  of the army
of the Republic  Srpska  for  the sake  of complicity  within  the meaning  of Article  3  (e)
of the Genocide  Convention  (see  Application  of the Convention  on the Prevention  and
Punishment  of the Crime  of Genocide  (Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  v. Serbia  and  Montenegro).
Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Report 2007, para. 422).
47 Military  and  Paramilitary  Activities  in and  against  Nicaragua  (Nicaragua  v. US),  op. cit.,
paras. 24,  29,  62,  109;  Case  Concerning  Armed  Activities  on the Territory  of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), op. cit., paras. 72, 91, 136.
48 This  is  the standard  that  some  scholars  have  extracted  from  the WTO  panel  decision
(see Waincymer,  J.  (2002)  WTO Litigation:  Procedural  Aspects  of Formal  Dispute  Settlement.
London: Cameron May, p. 568).
49 Greenwood,  C.  (1987)  International  Law  and the United  States,  Air  Operations  Against
Libya. West Virgina Law Review, 89, p. 935.
50 D’Aspremont, J. (2016) Cyber Operations and International Law: An Interventionist Legal
Thought. Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 21, pp. 581–582.
51 Declaration of Judge Simma,  Accordance with International  Law of the Unilateral  Declaration
of Independence  in Respect  of Kosovo, Advisory  Opinion,  22  July  2010.  ICJ  Reports  2010,
para. 9.
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As long  as the criticism  regarding  the transparency  of the expert
selection  process  and  the flaws  on the articulation  of Rules,  in particular
pertaining to the use of force, are not casted out, the degree of the authority
of the Tallinn  Manuals  as reflecting  lex  lata is  questioned.  Still,  they  are
the products of a communicative process which will undoubtedly influence
the making  of international  law  on cyber  operations.  If the immobility
of the traditional  international  law-making  process –  whether  in form
of universal  conventions  or judgments  from  authoritative  tribunals
indicating  customary  international  law –  cannot  be  overcome,  this
communicative  practice  will  definitely  contribute  to future  international
law-making.
4. CONCLUSION
International  law-making  at times  involves  the opinions  of legal  scholars
and  international  lawyers.  The Tallinn  Manuals  are  no  different  in this
respect.  However,  the claim that  the Tallinn Manuals  present  the existing
international  law  is  debatable  due  to the imbalanced  composition
of the drafters,  their  questionable  authority  and  the opaque  drafting
process. This article addressed the question to what extent legal scholarship
plays a role in international law-making. Based on communicative practices,
it argues that legal scholarship has a significant influence on the formation
and  interpretation  of international  law.  The  role  of legal  scholars
contributing to the international law-making has been particularly relevant
during  the absence  of concrete  and  specific  international  legal  rules
on cyber operations. The article argues that significant parts of the Tallinn
Manuals  have  been  shaped  by the intuition  of legal  scholars,  however,
without disclosing this fact. As scholars will  continue to play a significant
role  in the making  of international  law,  this  article  argues  that,  in this
process,  issues  of legitimacy  need  to be  addressed  more  thoroughly
by future scholarship.
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